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well “feel” green. Borrowing from O&N’s introduction (sect. 1.2):
What is the mapping function from a complex structure of senso-
rimotor contingencies onto the experience of one color or an-
other?
It seems to be important to O&N that “there is no simple, un-
analyzable core of the experience” (sect. 6.4). If this is so, it only
follows that there are no simple, unanalyzable qualia; qualia are
complex entities. It does not follow that qualia don’t exist (even if
there are philosophers who characterize qualia as simple). We are
still left with the problem of explaining how elements that have no
experiential quality can give rise to an experience when put to-
gether.
O&N seem to suggest that all there is to the quality of an ex-
perience is the structure of the sensorimotor contingencies –
experiences differ because they are based on the execution of
different sensorimotor contingencies. These contingencies, the
knowledge about them, and their execution are part of the func-
tional properties of our brains. The “explanatory gap” arises be-
cause all these information-processing activities could work as
well without us experiencing anything at all. If sensorimotor con-
tingencies are to explain conscious experience, the existence of
conscious experience should follow with logical necessity from the
existence of the appropriate sensorimotor contingencies (together
with the necessary boundary conditions, for example, a world in
which they can be executed, cf. Chalmers 1996a). To illustrate: We
could build the appropriate sensorimotor contingencies into a ro-
bot (e.g., one that can drive a Porsche, among other things), and
this should allow us to deduce that the machine has a rich inner
life (e.g., is able to feel what it is like to drive a Porsche). I’d rather
stay agnostic on this, even for a very graceful robot.
It seems that O&N would be more confident. In their discus-
sion of blindsight (sect. 7.2) they define experience in terms of be-
ing able to describe and react appropriately to what one sees. This
is a common materialist reply to the hard problem: The denial of
phenomenal experience as an explanandum – everything that
needs explaining is behaviour (Dennett 1991). In this case it all
comes down to the empirical question, which theory is better
suited to explain the observed behavior. Then, however, there is
no room for the “fundamental question” raised in the introduc-
tion: How does anything going on in our brains and their causal
interactions with the world give rise to experience? With regard to
this question, the approach of O&N does not achieve more than
any other theory of vision: It simply evades it.
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Abstract: O’Regan & Noë (O&N) fail to address adequately the two most
historically important reasons for seeking to explain visual experience in
terms of internal representations. They are silent about the apparently in-
ferential nature of perception, and mistaken about the significance of the
phenomenology accompanying dreams, hallucinations, and mental im-
agery.
Despite the plethora of theories that have surfaced over the years,
there are really only two ways of explaining visual experience. The
first accords with the commonsense intuition that when we open
our eyes and look around, we have direct access to the world. In
this view, visual experience supervenes on the interaction between
our visual apparatus and the visually detectable properties of the
environment. The second approach rejects commonsense, and
holds that our perceptual access to the world is always indirect.
What we see is not the actual world; what we see (or, better, what
we see with) are mental representations constructed by our
brains. According to this “constructivist” conception, visual expe-
rience supervenes on the brain alone.
Although the history of vision science has seen many oscillations
between these two poles, constructivism currently dominates the
discipline. O’Regan & Noë’s (O&N’s) sensorimotor account of
vision, on the other hand, favours commonsense over mainstream
thinking. The great drawback with constructivist theories of vi-
sion, they observe, is that such theories are burdened with the
problem of explaining how neural representations give rise to vi-
sual experiences – a problem that has stubbornly resisted all at-
tempts at resolution. By contrast, their sensorimotor account, pre-
cisely because it rejects the idea that the brain constructs visual
experiences, steps right over this explanatory gap. Visual experi-
ences occur when our visual apparatus, replete with the structure
of its sensorimotor contingencies, actively engages with the world.
Such experiences are not states in the head, they are “ways of act-
ing” (sect. 6.3).
O&N are right about the extra explanatory burden that is car-
ried by constructivist theories of perception. And they are no
doubt right to be dissatisfied with current attempts to explain the
qualitative character of visual experience in representational
terms. Nonetheless, before abandoning constructivism it would
be wise to consider why, for nearly thirty years now, vision scien-
tists have almost universally adopted this counter-intuitive ap-
proach. The reasons are numerous, but two deserve special men-
tion because of their historical significance.
First, our perceptual responses are underdetermined by the in-
formation our visual apparatus garners from its interaction with
the world. The conclusion many theorists find inescapable is that,
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, visual perception
must be an inferential process – one that constructs representa-
tions of the environment by combining stimulus data with infor-
mation internal to the perceiver. (This form of argument is too fa-
miliar to require detailed rehearsal here. For a classic rendering
see Fodor and Pylyshyn 1981, and for a more recent statement see
Palmer 1999b, p. 55. Palmer notes that the structure of the envi-
ronment cannot be unambiguously determined by stimulus data,
even if we factor in the dynamics of organism-environment cou-
pling, because “time is also a dimension of the environment.”)
Second, there are several kinds of visual experience which oc-
cur when organism and environment are not actively coupled. The
standard examples are the visual experiences that accompany
dreams, hallucinations, and mental imagery. Such experiences
provide compelling evidence that neural activity is sometimes suf-
ficient for visual awareness. Furthermore, many theorists think it
reasonable to surmise that dreams and hallucinations indicate
something important about the nature of visual experience more
generally, namely, that even “veridical” experiences are con-
structed by the brain, and thus implicate internal representations.
O&N are silent about the first of these reasons for preferring
constructivism, a serious omission given the fundamental role this
form of argument has played in shaping cognitive science. They
do, however, address dreams and mental imagery, albeit briefly
(sect. 4.4). According to O&N, the worry is that “since dreams and
mental images are apparently pictorial in nature, this seems to
show that we are, after all, capable of creating an internal iconic
image.” But this, they think, is as misguided “as the supposition
that to see red, there must be red neurons in the brain,” and con-
clude that “the supposed fact that things appear pictorial to us in
no way requires there to be pictures in the head.”
O&N’s response here is lame, because they misconstrue the
problem that dreams, hallucinations, and mental imagery pose for
their account. These mental phenomena are problematic not be-
cause they seem to depend on internal icons; they are problem-
atic because they can occur in the absence of any interaction be-
tween the visual apparatus and the world. The precise form of
visual representations – whether, for example, they are more like
pictures or linguistic tokens – is indeed a much debated issue (see
Block 1981). But this is a debate within the constructivist camp,
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not between advocates of constructivism and their critics. What
O&N must demonstrate is that they can account for the phenom-
enology associated with dreams, hallucinations, and mental im-
agery without postulating internal representations of any kind. At
the very least they must explain how visual experiences can arise
in situations where the very activity that is supposed to account for
experience is missing.
To sum up: O&N are guilty of two sins, one of omission and one
of commission. They are silent about the apparently inferential na-
ture of perception, and mistaken about the problem that dreams,
hallucinations, and mental imagery create for their sensorimotor
account of vision. Since O&N fail to address adequately the two
most important arguments for constructivism, it is reasonable to
conclude that the challenge for visual science remains that of ex-
plaining how neural representations give rise to visual experi-
ences.
Perceptual theories that emphasize action 
are necessary but not sufficient
John R. Pani
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Louisville,
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Abstract: Theories that make action central to perception are plausible,
though largely untried, for space perception. However, explaining object
recognition, and high-level perception generally, will require reference to
representations of the world in some form. Nonetheless, action is central
to cognition, and explaining high-level perception will be aided by inte-
grating an understanding of action with other aspects of perception.
Theoretical advances in psychology nearly always follow new em-
pirical demonstrations. If the sensorimotor theory of perception
proves to be an advance, it will be because it provides a success-
ful account of the phenomena of change blindness. On this point,
it seems to me that where the theory concerns space perception,
it has much to recommend it. Change blindness, however, appears
relevant also to object and scene recognition (e.g., Archambault et
al. 1999; Hollingworth & Henderson 2000; Pani 2000), and here
the sensorimotor theory seems to be on uncertain ground. None-
theless, it is important to develop theories in which the possibili-
ties for action are embedded in our understanding and use of con-
cepts.
Low-level perception. O’Regan & Noë (O&N) suggest that
perception consists largely of mastering sensorimotor contingen-
cies through a variety of different forms of action. This conception
reinforces a number of important statements about perception.
One of these is J. J. Gibson’s (e.g., 1979/1986) argument that per-
ception does not include static percepts, such as a percept of the
shape of an object. Instead, perception involves tuning the sen-
sory systems to sets of relations and transformations that occur
continuously, often due to observer action or locomotion. The in-
dividual becomes attuned to the information that specifies an ob-
ject of constant shape, and static percepts of shape are unneces-
sary. In extending this view to higher perceptual and cognitive
functions, Neisser (e.g., 1976) argued that the anticipation of per-
ceptual information within systems of action was the essential in-
gredient for bridging perception and cognition.
The authors add two elements to this account. First, the world
serves as an outside memory for action. Second, our perception of
the world is not a reflection of the content of mental representa-
tions, but rather, is due to the structure of the world itself and our
ability to act intelligently with respect to it. That is, perceptual
knowledge exists only in sensorimotor action.
To account for change blindness, the authors discount the no-
tion that untutored intuitions about the richness of momentary
perceptions are a sound basis for theory. They suggest that each
moment of perception includes relatively sparse information, and
that it is through the combined efforts of well-adapted actions that
the richness of perception is constituted. Successful action is suc-
cessful perception, and no representation of the world is neces-
sary.
For perception of geometric properties of the world, this seems
a reasonable approach, but significant theoretical challenges re-
main. People not only perceive and act in a complex world, they
understand that they do, as evidenced by their concepts, language,
and behavior. For example, we understand that innumerable sac-
cades and shifts of attention extended across time and space all
sample information from one scene. How do we know this (see
Neisser 1976)? The more severe we are in saying that there is no
information outside of the focus of attention, and the more severe
we are in rejecting the contribution of mental representations
(e.g., in working memory), the more challenging these issues be-
come. It will be nontrivial to work out the details of such an ac-
count, and it may be necessary to allow more information into
momentary perceptions and working memory. To revive a debate
that took place with regard to auditory attention (e.g., Norman
1969), change blindness may be due in part to limitations on mem-
ory (see Hollingworth 2001; Pani 2000; Simons 2000b).
High-level perception. It was a truism insisted upon by the be-
haviorists years ago that knowledge is expressed in behavior. No
sensible cognitive theory ultimately isolates its components from
the necessity to generate actions, and theories about action are not
necessarily theories without representations.
At the same time, no theory of human perception (as a whole)
can avoid the fact that perception includes object recognition, and
that recognition involves categorization. Categories are pivot-
points that determine choices between potentially large sets of di-
verse actions, and they affect action at every level from eye move-
ments on upward (see Lichtenstein & Brewer 1980). The broad
shift of behavior that comes from realizing, for example, that a
store is closed or that an animal is stuffed demonstrates that the
individual knows what these facts mean. And the stored informa-
tion about what something means can be considered to be a rep-
resentation, whether or not the function of that information is to
generate behavior. Even if a theory of object recognition is de-
voted to explaining human action, claiming that the theory has no
representations may be little more than an aesthetic decision re-
garding labels.
Categories, thinking, and concepts. Having expressed some
skepticism about the stronger claims of the sensorimotor theory, I
would like also to express some enthusiasm about the enterprise.
As theories of concepts based on the possibilities of action are de-
veloped, new sets of explanations become possible. Some cogni-
tive phenomena will be associated particularly closely with this
type of explanation. For example, people’s typical indifference to
how well mental images depict information probably is due to the
fact that the images are part of a larger effort for which pictorial
fidelity of any single image is unnecessary to the outcome (see
Pani 1996). Similarly, the time-honored problem of the con-
sciousness of meanings (as opposed to sensations and images)
probably will have to be explained as an instance of a complex state
of preparation within sets of possible actions (Brown 1958;
Humphrey 1951; Pani 1996). For example, try a bit of introspec-
tion. Answer the question: Can a man marry his widow’s sister? As
you came to your answer, what was the nature of the conscious
event? I suspect that describing the experience as a changed set
of anticipations with respect to possible actions related to the man
in question (e.g., whether to introduce yourself ) is much more
promising than a description that refers to images or internal
speech.
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